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The extent of social mobility is one of three key considerations - along with living
standards and the level of inequality - in any assessment of a society’s economic mer-
its. The intergenerational correlation (IGC) between the incomes of parents and their
children provides a summary statistic of income mobility, where low income correla-
tions reﬂect high mobility, whilst high correlations reﬂect low mobility. As such it has
become the primary measure of this variable.1 The main alternative measure, in the
form of mobility matrices, is unable to provide a single measure of mobility but has
the advantage of capturing variation in mobility across different parts of the income
distribution.2
The extant literature on the calculation of the IGC has been premised on the notion
that ‘permanent income’ is the key variable in the estimated equation. In other words,
to the extent that the factors relating parents’ income status to their children’s can be
captured using income correlations, this can be achieved solely through permanent in-
come.3 This appears to have been the premise since the earliest calculations of this
measure were made - see for instance (Bowles, 1972)4 - but has been especially promi-
nent since the realisation that many of the previous estimates of income correlations (in
the United States) appear to have been biased downward by the attenuation bias that
is the outcome of classical measurement error (CEV). 5 The estimates affected by this
attenuation bias had led various authors - most notably Becker (1988) - to conclude
that the United States was a society characterised by a high level of social mobility.
Subsequently, a number of studies have shown that using multi-year averages of
parentalincomedramaticallyincreasesthecalculatedregressioncoefﬁcients andhence
the correlation coefﬁcient. In addition, it appears that this effect increases with the
number of years used, to the extent that with up to sixteen years the correlation ap-
proaches 0.6 (Mazumder, 2005b) as compared to about 0.4 with four years (Solon,
1992; Zimmerman, 1992), and 0.2 with one year (Behrman and Taubman, 1985).6
More recently the literature has moved-on in two directions: assessing the dynamics
of mobility based on the IGC; and attempting to break the IGC into its constituent
1Although note that correlations amongst other attributes - occupational status, education level, etc. -
might be used in place of income. The former is particularly popular in the sociology literature - see for
instance the survey by Birkelund (2006), and the work by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993).
2Behrman (1999) is an accessible discussion on the merits and limitations of mobility matrices.
3Notice that there is presently no use of causal notions here, or suggestion that the relevant factors are
wholly captured by income (permanent or otherwise). See the caveats later in this Introduction and the
discussion in section 4.
4Although Bowles was primarily interested in the effect of education rather than income on children’s
outcomes, his emphasis in considering the latter was very much on permanent income (Bowles, 1972: Table
2: 230)
5We prefer the word ‘realisation’ to ‘discovery’ in this context because in fact the issue of measurement
error appears to have been appreciated from the outset. Becker and Tomes (1986) note that a number of
authors had by that time used multi-year averages to address this concern. That their estimates were still
very low is perhaps indicative of the additional attenuation bias due to relatively homogenous samples (see
the brief discussions in (Solon, 1989, 1992)). In fact, Bowles (1972), referred to previously, appears to have
been the ﬁrst to recognise this problem as well as the salience of the correlation in the transitory component
of income - see section 4.
6Solon and Zimmerman use different datasets but reach similar estimates: the former uses the University
of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) dataset, whilst the latter uses the National Longitu-
dinal Survey (NLS).
1parts.7 In other words, asking how mobility has changed over time, and what factors
underlie the intergenerational persistence in income/earnings.
Whilst these are important issues - the latter being particularly critical for policy
purposes - in this paper we initially return to the original problem of estimating the
magnitude of the intergenerational correlation coefﬁcient. Our fundamental proposi-
tion is that using a regression based on a notion of ’permanent income’ to estimate
the IGC may result in unobserved heterogeneity if ‘transitory’ parental income also
affects children’s income. In addition, we suggest that transitory income may matter
to different degrees depending on the age of the child in the corresponding year. In
econometric terms, the ﬁrst implication of these propositions is that the variables be-
ing used to proxy for permanent income should be independent regressors in a full
model of children’s income. Furthermore, assuming these to be of equal importance -
either as proxies, or even as independent covariates - may itself introduce a bias into
the calculation of the IGC.
Neither of these possibilities appears to have been formally accounted for in the
literature to date. This is especially problematic because in decomposing the IGC a
number of researchers have asked the, seemingly counter-intuitive, question: “Does
(parents’) money matter?”. But as we will argue in subsequent sections, the permanent
income model of intergenerational mobility that is used in the literature to some degree
begs this very question.
Some Caveats in the Interpretation of the IGE
Before proceeding, we should state some important caveats regarding the interpretation
of the intergenerational correlation in income.
IGE versus IGC First, we shall, for the rest of this paper, deal primarily with the
IGE (intergenerational elasticity) rather than the IGC that we have referred to until
now. Most of the more recent literature (for instance Solon (1992) and Mazumder
(2005b)) assumes these to be equivalent. In fact, this is only the case if the variance
in the (explanatory) parental income variable is equivalent to that in the (dependent)
children’s income variable as shown below. If children’s log income is represented by




So as (Bowles and Gintis, 2002: 6) note, “In effect, the intergenerational correlation
coefﬁcient ρ is affected by changes in the distribution of income while the intergener-
ational elasticity is not”. Most authors follow Solon (1992) in assuming that approxi-
mate equivalence between the two is an empirically reasonable assumption - which it
appears to be.
7See d’Addio (2007) for perhaps the most comprehensive survey to date of the literature on intergenera-
tional mobility.
2However, the original theoretical contribution of this paper - put forward in section 4
- leads us to propose a conception of the IGE which cannot be equated to a correlation,
but which we argue is superior to the approach currently used in the literature. For the
rest of the paper we shall therefore focus on the IGE rather than the IGC.
Causality A second caveat is that one should not necessarily infer the extent of a
causal relation from the value of the IGE. Whilst this paper challenges the assertion
that there is no causal relation between parental income and children’s economic out-
comes, it is inevitable that the true IGE overstates any causal relation that does exist
because of the correlation between parental income and other explanatory variables
in the structural equation for children’s economic success. Thus whilst the IGE re-
mains a valid and relevant measure of (im)mobility, the details of what determines that
(im)mobility need to be the subject of further enquiry.
Optimality Given that a low IGE implies high social mobility - and therefore po-
tentially lower dynastic inequality - it might seem an obvious step to suggest that the
lowest possible IGE is best by some egalitarian standard. However, as a number of
authors have pointed out, higher mobility is not necessarily desirable.8 The idea that
immobility is bad is largely a function of the belief in the importance of equal oppor-
tunity: it seems unfair that some children should earn more than others simply because
they were lucky enough to be born to rich parents. And yet, there are few people today
who would argue that the inheritance of attractiveness or intergenerational transmission
of traits associated with hard work are unfair and should be done away with. Thus the
inferences we make about the desirability of a given society based on its IGE are fun-
damentally reliant on the factors underlying that correlation - which is why unearthing
these factors is such a major concern of the recent literature.
Life-Cycle Bias A ﬁnal caveat relates to a possible bias in the calculation of the
IGE. This may result from the fact that income for parents and their children are of-
ten taken at different stages of the life-cycle; something reinforced by the nature of
panel datasets in which children’s income is often from the beginning of their careers,
whereas parents’ income is observed somewhat later. The standard way of dealing with
this problem in empirical work is to ﬁrst regress the variables on a quadratic or quartic
in age, and use the residuals from these regressions in calculating the intergenerational
correlation - though Jenkins (1987) casts doubt on the merits of this approach. From
the perspective taken in this paper we will not assume that our variables have been
residualised in this way unless stated otherwise. Since age variation in income can
in some sense be characterised as ‘transitory’, and the fundamental hypothesis of this
paper is that transitory income may have independent explanatory power, it seems in-
appropriate to residualise on age ex ante. (Though we do in fact pursue this approach
in the empirical work of section 6, but for somewhat different reasons.)
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the con-
ceptual basis for the proposal that transitory income is of independent importance for
8In fact there are a number of reasons why one would not want to reach the extreme of complete mobility
represented by an IGE of zero. For instance, Harding, Jencks, Lopoo and Mayer (2005) suggest that there
are at least three reasons - genes, assortative mating, and ‘cultural ideals and preferences’ - why we would
still calculate a non-zero IGE even if full equality of opportunity prevailed. For more detailed discussions of
the philosophical issues around mobility and equal opportunity, see Roemer (2000) and Swift (2005).
3children’s outcomes. In Section 3 we outline the standard econometric approach to
calculating the IGE that has been used in the literature to date, including the estimation
issues that have arisen within the bounds of that model. In Section 4, which is the theo-
retical core of this paper, we propose an alternative model that includes parental transi-
tory income as an explanatory factor in the equation for children’s permanent income.
The consequences for the interpretation of past IGE estimates are then demonstrated,
and we brieﬂy discuss some possible solutions to the problems with past approaches.
Section 5 assesses various estimation options using Monte Carlo simulations, and gives
an indication of the extent of the bias in the IGE for different values of the parameters
in the alternative model. Section 6 presents the ﬁndings from an empirical assessment
of the proposals of the previous two sections using the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID). Section 7 discusses the ouputs in Section 6, and allays concerns about our
estimation procedures. The results suggest that transitory parental income does matter
for children’s future income, explaining about 20% of the intergenerational elasticity.
Section 8 goes on to consider some important extensions of the foregoing analysis and
arguments, andexaminestheirimplicationsforpublicpolicybasedonintergenerational
mobility studies. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Problem with Ex Ante Black-Boxing of Trans-
mission Mechanisms
The neglect of the above-mentioned issues in the literature appears to stem from the
view that permanent income is the variable with which we should be exclusively con-
cerned when assessing income persistence. This need not be a problematic assertion
per se, but the concept itself is typically not interrogated to any signiﬁcant degree. In
the context of the transmission of material well-being, one needs to ask what the envi-
sioned role of parental income is. Most studies black-box this issue on the grounds that
the authors are not interested in the details of the channels of transmission but rather
the gross effect.9 The problem, however, is that if we give insigniﬁcant attention to
possible causal channels the implicit model upon which we base our estimation of the
gross effect may be ﬂawed.
To see how this approach can result in incorrect econometric logic consider two
hypothetical extreme cases. In the ﬁrst, we have a society in which all children are to
be sent to state boarding schools - established in all major towns - from the age of 6
until at least the age of 15. The state covers all costs, but parents can choose to have
their children return home (i.e. leave school) after the child has completed nine years of
schooling. In the second, the society in question is a very poor one, with malnutrition
and disease being common problems - particularly amongst infants and young children.
In the ﬁrst example it seems perfectly reasonable to expect that parental income
around the period at which the child ﬁnishes their ninth year of schooling (and pos-
sibly around the time at which the child turns six years old - depending on the extent
9Sometimes this is expressed explicitly when explaining the reason for not including explanatory vari-
ables other than income. (Mazumder, 2005b: 237) for instance states that: “Other covariates are generally
not included (in the regression equation), because the goal is to obtain a summary measure of all factors
related to income that are transmitted over generations. Therefore ρ should not be given a causal interpreta-
tion.”
4of enforcement) will exert a greater effect on the child’s future income, because of
the returns to further education, than that of other periods. This admittedly relies on
the non-existence of perfect credit markets, but not on existing credit markets being
especially imperfect.10 Retaining this assumption, in the second example it is again
plausible to expect that parental income in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of childhood will have
a greater impact on the child’s future income than income in other years. This could
work(negatively) through children’s ability (proxied by IQ) and health, as the most
obvious channels.
These examples demonstrate our two key points, that:
1. Transitory income could well be important for child outcomes and hence also
their future incomes
2. The extent of this importance may vary by the stage of childhood.
Note that in the above we are assuming the interest in analysing income correla-
tions to be a general one i.e. not conﬁned to particular societal contexts or levels of
development. The broader intuition can nevertheless be translated into more familiar
contexts: replace the decision to stay in school with the decision to enter tertiary edu-
cation; and replace early childhood malnourishment and disease with non-participation
in preschool, and the relevance of the argument to estimates based on developed coun-
try datasets becomes more apparent. In the case of education, Cameron and Heckman
(2001) in fact suggest that - based on their analysis of US data - family income matters
primarily for education decisions prior to college enrolment.11
Permanent Income
Since the analysis that follows hinges on the above arguments, it is worthwhile con-
sidering the notion of permanent income in a little more detail. Essentially, the propo-
sition, made by Friedman (1957), is that investment and savings behaviour will be
premised on long-term income or expectations thereof rather than simply year-by-year
variations. Consumption and expenditure are also expected to be smoothed over a
multi-year period, possibly an entire lifetime. Some authors assume that the only real-
world factor which prevents the realisation of this model’s predictions is the absence of
perfect credit or capital markets (and possibly also the absence of perfect foresight). In
addition, from an empirical perspective, there is the possibility of inaccuracies in the
reported income captured in surveys.
10The assumption of non-perfect credit markets should not be controversial given that it is in some sense
implicit in claims that ‘measurement error’ is a serious problem. Later in this paper we make use of the
empirical output of longitudinal studies that decompose the variance in income into a permanent component,
and transitory white noise and serially correlated components. Although some of the the transitory variance
may be attributable to measurement error from data capture it seems unlikely to all be of this sort. Mazumder
(2001, 2003) attributes the variance from the white noise component to this, but does not provide his basis
for doing so.
11Cameron and Heckman study the effect of family income on children’s education and ﬁnd that “(the)
evidence suggests that it is family income at earlier ages and not later ones that matters in explaining college
attendance” (Cameron and Heckman, 2001: 488).
5If these assumptions of perfect markets and perfect measurement do not hold, then
using one year’s income will imperfectly measure ‘permanent’ income - provided an-
nual (realised) income varies to some degree over an individual’s lifetime - and hence
the associated investment, savings and consumption decisions. To the extent that
parental permanent income affects children’s income via any of these channels, and
in the absence of controlling for factors such as parental ability that it proxies for, us-
ing one year of parental income to calculate intergenerational income correlations will
result in estimates subject to attenuation bias. This is the rationale for the approaches
taken in most estimates of intergenerational relations in the economics literature over
recent decades.
The model used in the intergenerational mobility literature is typically more crude
than that envisioned in theory. In part this is because the notion of permanent income
in its original form is notoriously difﬁcult to pin-down empirically: How are we to
deﬁne income expectations? On what basis and over what period are they formed?
And how, for instance, do we incorporate these into estimations of intergenerational
elasticities? One way around these complications is to suggest - as Mazumder (2003)
and others do - that permanent income and average lifetime income are equivalents,
allowing us to use the latter as our ‘ideal’/preferred explanatory variable. There are
two reasons to be sceptical of such a formulation. First, actual income is merely a
realisation of some underlying, possibly transmissible, earning potential. Since it is
this potential that we in fact want to capture, it is more plausible to view actual income
as imperfectly proxying for this fundamental, but inherently unobservable, variable.
Second, individuals’ income expectations are likely to be over limited horizons. So in
fact permanent income is not likely to be constant either. 12
There is a large literature spread across the sub-disciplines of decision theory, be-
havioural economics and experimental economics which suggests that individuals may
consume in ways quite different from such idealised, lifetime smoothing even without
credit constraints. As Thaler (1990) points out, “a consensus seems to be emerging
among economists that consumption is too sensitive to current income to be consistent
with a lifetime conception of permanent income”. That being the case, there is good
reason to believe that estimates of intergenerational income relations based on the sim-
plistic standard model, as well as similarly-founded attempts at determining a causal
role for such income, are likely to be ﬂawed.
One should also note that under the permanent income hypothesis different goods
are likely to be associated with different conceptions of permanent income. The ‘in-
come horizon’ that inﬂuences consumption of perishables is likely shorter than that
which inﬂuences the consumption of durables: “there seems no reason why the hori-
zon should be the same for all individual categories of consumption and some reasons
12Friedman himself actually makes both these points. On the ﬁrst: “It is tempting to interpret the perma-
nent components as corresponding to average lifetime values and the transitory components as the difference
between such lifetime values and the measured values in a speciﬁc time period. It would, however, be a
serious mistake to accept such an interpretation for two reasons...the experience of one unit is itself but a
small sample from a more extensive hypothetical universe, so there is no reason to assume that transitory
components average out to zero over the unit’s lifetime...more important, it seems neither necessary nor
desirable to decide in advance the precise meaning to be attached to ‘permanent’. The distinction between
permanent and transitory is intended to interpret actual behaviour.” (Friedman, 1957: 23).
6why it should differ systematically. For example, it seems highly plausible that hous-
ing expenditures are planned in terms of a longer horizon,and so a different concept of
permanent income, than expenditures on, say, food.” (Friedman, 1957: 207-208).
This point is particularly important for the proposals in this paper. Analyses of the
time-series properties of individuals’ income only identify one ‘permanent component’
which one might view as in fact being the permanent component associated with the
longest horizon length. In a developed country like the United States where virtually
the whole population is above a basic level of nutrition - whether through their incomes
or state support via food vouchers - we would not expect transitory income to affect
children’s development to a great degree via any differences it might make to food con-
sumption. However, in a poor country this may be a primary channel of transmission.
We shall return to this issue, but note that in general one might expect that consider-
ation of transitory incomes in estimating persistence will increase the IGE by more in
poor countries than richer ones. This is because ﬂuctuations will inﬂuence the con-
sumption of goods with shorter horizons at a level at which - in a developing country
- they continue to have impact on children’s outcomes, and this effect will be further
reinforced by the relative absence of credit markets.13
In response to these concerns two alternatives present themselves:
• Developamorenuancedmodel ofpermanentincomewhichincorporatesincome
expectations and their horizons, and use this to estimate the IGE in income;
• Or extend what we shall call the ‘standard model’ for estimating the IGE to
incorporate a role for ‘transitory’ parental income in inﬂuencing children’s future
income.14
In the rest of this paper we will pursue the second of these options. This has a num-
ber of advantages. It allows us to clearly link the model we develop to the preferred
model in the literature. At the same time it requires no ex ante assumptions about the
precise structure of income expectations and the associated consumption behaviour.
Finally, it means that we are able to use the results from decompositions of variation in
longitudinal income - e.g. Baker and Solon (2003) - as existing estimates of some of
our model parameters. At the end of the day, as Friedman notes, the fundamental ob-
jective is the explanation of actual behaviour; provided the conceptualisation achieves
this it has served its purpose. Section 4 outlines a model which we suggest covers a
sufﬁciently broad range of possibilities to satisfy that criterion.
3 The Standard Model
Before developing our alternative model it may be useful to formally review the econo-
metric structure of the standard model discussed above, as well as the technical devel-
13Although there has been important progress in the provision of credit to the poor (particularly the rural
poor) in some countries, recognised for instance by the awarding of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize to Muham-
mad Yunus the founder of Grameen Bank, this remains the exception rather than the norm.
14The scare quotes around ‘transitory’ are intended to indicate that this is not necessarily transitory income
as envisioned by Friedman (1957) but rather transitory income in the sense of variation not explained by a
permanent lifetime component of income variation (which is assumed in the literature to be equivalent to
actual permanent income as envisioned by Friedman).
7opments that have taken place within the boundaries of this structure.
The primary model used in the IGE literature to date is one which bases calculation
ofthisparameteronaregressionofchildren’spermanentincomeonparents’permanent
income and some random noise.15 The annual income of both parents and children is
assumed to be a function of their respective permanent incomes and other, transitory,
factors. These assumptions are represented in the following equations.
y0is = y0i + w0is + v0is (1)
y1it = y1i + w1it + v1it (2)
y1i = ρy0i + ε (3)
Where y0is represents parental income in year s and y1it represents the child’s
income in year t. Following Mazumder (2003) these are each expressed as functions
of a permanent component (y0i and y1i), transitory component (w0is and w1it) and a
white-noise component (v0is and v1it) respectively.16
Within the bounds of this model, two problems were identiﬁed (see Solon, 1989):
bias due to homogenous samples, and that due to measurement error. The former has
been neglected in the more recent literature because of the increased availability of na-
tionally representative datasets, but it is important in as much as it serves to explain
why earlier estimates that corrected for the problem of measurement error by using
averaged parental income still calculated correlations much lower than subsequent es-
timates. We will not, however, discuss this bias any further in this paper.
It is the problem created by the transitory factors in the latter two equations that
have been the concern of more recent attempts at estimating the true IGE. In particular,
it is well known that in this type of case one can show that a calculation based on
one measure (year) of the explanatory variable (parental income) will be subject to
attenuation bias and hence be lower than the true value.









σW0,σV0 and σY0 are the variances of the transitory, white noise and permanent
components respectively.
15Previous studies have typically focused on fathers’ income rather than parental income as a whole, due
in large part to the empirical complications of using mothers’ income. Our empirical analysis in Section 6
makes this assumption for similar reasons, but since family income is arguably a more relevant measure -
particularly if one believes that there is a causal inﬂuence of income on children’s outcomes - we assume for
this and the next section that the independent variable represents family income.
16In fact, Mazumder discards the white-noise component in a later paper (Mazumder, 2005b) as it doesn’t
add much to his main results. It may however be rather important for the concerns of this paper, and hence
we retain it.
8α represents the effect of serial correlation in the transitory component. We show
below that if there is no serial correlation - as assumed above - then α = 1. So in
(4) λT is the attenuation factor, with 0 < λT < 1. The attenuation problem can be
mitigated by averaging over T such measures (years), as indicated by the terms in the
denominator.
A more plausible assumption - following Bowles (1972), Solon (1992), Zimmer-
man (1992) and Mazumder (2005b) - is that there is serial correlation in the transitory
component of income, in which case we have:
w0is = δw0is−1 + ξ0is (5)





T − δT − 1 + δT
T(1 − δ)2

Whilst it is true in both cases that increasing the number of years in the average
will decrease the bias, in the latter case the correlation between the transitory compo-
nents serves to mitigate this. This can be easily seen by noting that α > 1,∀δ > 0.
Mazumder’s innovation is to note the implications of this result for the extent of atten-
uation remaining after taking four- or ﬁve-year averages (as Solon (1992) and Zimmer-
man (1992) did). By taking averages over much longer periods (Mazumder, 2005b),
and using a new technique to account for this possibility (Mazumder, 2003), he ar-
gues that the correlation coefﬁcient in the United States is around 0.6, rather than the
previous estimates of 0.4.
From the above it should be clear that in the literature to date on calculating IGEs
in income, transitory components have been seen as mere nuisance terms - obscuring
the true relation between the incomes of children and that of their parents. Hence
the efforts to remove their inﬂuence through averaging. In the next section, following
our discussion in Section 2, we examine the implications of children’s income being a
function of the permanent and transitory components of their parents’ income.
4 Implications of an Alternative View
As noted in the previous discussion of permanent income, the idea of transitory in-
come affecting child outcomes - and hence their incomes - is quite plausible. What it
does require is an acceptance of a causal link between parental resources and child out-
comes. The model above implicitly assumes no correlation between the transitory and
permanent components. The latter will capture the impact of such constant factors as
parental education, traits, genetic attributes and any causal role of the permanent com-
ponent of income itself. Hence if transitory income is to have any effect it must be via
a direct, causal effect on children’s outcomes. Those unfamiliar with this particular lit-
erature might be surprised to discover that the possibility of income of any sort having
a causal effect is not widely accepted. Shea (2000) for instance, in his article entitled
“Does parents’ money matter?”, ﬁnds that parental income has a negative relation to
their children’s incomes once other factors are controlled for. And Mayer (1998) con-
cludes her investigation into what parents’ money can buy for their children’s futures
9by stating that “although children’s opportunities are unequal, income inequality is not
the primary reason”(Mayer, 1998: 156).17
There are at least two authors (see Mazumder, 2005b; Hertz, 2005) who have dis-
cussed the possibility that income matters. (Hertz, 2005: 10-11) states that he prefers
“the residency criterion to the biological criterion”, and therefore uses averages of
parental income earned during childhood (or at least when the child was resident in
the household) rather than from other periods. Mazumder does not explicitly do this
in his estimations, although given the breadth of his averaging he probably includes
most childhood income. However, he does have a fairly detailed discussion (2005b:
251-253) on the possible import of borrowing constraints. The salient point here is
that such constraints imply an inability to fully smooth the usage of income over the
lifecycle, and hence can be captured as a deviation from permanent income.
The problem with both these papers is that their discussions are strictly speaking
disallowed by the implicit structure in their models; characterised by equations (1) -
(3), which only allow for a relation between children’s permanent income and their
parents’ permanent income. The result is a lacuna between work of the kind done by
CameronandHeckman(2001)mentionedpreviously, andthatofMazumder, Solonand
others. Even worse, as we will argue in Section 6, it may result in potentially serious
ﬂaws in the conclusions drawn from disaggregating the intergenerational correlation.18
To discuss the salience of transitory income in a rigorous fashion requires that we ﬁrst
allow for the possibility in our estimated models.
4.1 An Alternative Model
The necessary modiﬁcation to the basic model above is shown in (6). The second term
allows children’s permanent income (y1i) to be a function of deviations from parents’
permanent income (z0iq).
y1i = ρy0i +
X
q
βqz0iq + ε (6)
Where z0iq = y0iq − y0i = (w0iq + v0iq)
and q ∈ Q,s ∈ S,Q ⊂ S
Two things are noteworthy here. First, q indexes years of childhood. We will as-
sume henceforth that there are twenty-one such years, including the year preceding the
child’s birth.19 s indexes all years of parental income (see equation (1)). Second, the
coefﬁcient on these years - represented by β - is allowed to vary by year of childhood.
In other words, transitory income may have a different impact depending on what stage
17A remarkable aspect of Shea’s paper is that he does not seek to justify the highly counterintuitive ﬁnding
of negative, rather than merely insigniﬁcant or very small, coefﬁcients on parental income. However, his
instrumentation strategy is - as has been noted by Solon (1999) - not wholly convincing.
18We refer to the IGC rather than IGE here because it has tended to be the former which is dealt with in
these decompositions (see Bowles and Gintis, 2002).
19The issue of which years are salient is in fact an empirical question. One might think that the lower
bound cannot be extended further - though see the results in section 6 - but there may be good reasons for the
upper bound to be extended; the possible importance of parental income in assisting job search, or keeping
children in tertiary education, amongst others.
10of childhood it is experienced in. (This is something we will return to in subsequent
sections.)
This model can be classiﬁed as having a ‘mechanical’ rather than ‘economic’ struc-
ture, in as much as it does not explicate the the details of the relational mechanims (see
discussion in 7.3). Under it we continue to have the problem of correctly estimating the
impact of unobservable permanent income, but in addition we now need to estimate the
independent impact of the transitory components as well. It seems appropriate to ﬁrst
investigate the implications of our model for the estimations carried-out in previous
studies, and on the basis of this we will then suggest some alternative approaches.
The True IGE
Before we can do this there is one fundamental question that needs to be answered:
what is the true IGE under this alternative model? Initially one might think that it is
ρ +
P
βq where the betas are summed over all T years of childhood. However, this
is incorrect. Given that permanent income is - by deﬁnition - present in every year, it












Henceforth, when we refer to the ‘true IGE’ we are referring to ρ∗.
4.2 Estimation of IGE Using One Year of Parental Income
As noted in the introductory discussion, many earlier estimates of the IGE were based
on regressions using a single year of parental income. One might wonder what the
probability limits on these coefﬁcients would be under our alternative model. In par-
ticular, we are concerned with the extent to which these estimates would pick-up the
impact of transitory income if it exists.
An important point to make at this stage is that for any estimations conducted in
the context of the alternative model proposed above it is necessary to be explicit about
whether the parental income used is from within childhood, or outside it; where we
have assumed ‘childhood’ to include the year in which the child is in utero until they
are twenty years of age (though see footnote 19).
4.2.1 Income earned outside of childhood
If the single year of income is taken from a period outside of childhood we can charac-
terise the probability limit of the coefﬁcient as follows:











Note that we use k to index the year(s) used in the estimation.
11The denominator in the expression above is the same as that in (4) - with the appro-
priate expression for α (here, α = 1) - but the numerator now has a second term. It
represents the sum of the coefﬁcients on transitory income for each year of childhood,
each weighted by a value (δ|q−k|) which is a function of the correlation in the transitory
component w0 (i.e. δ), and the proximity of that particular year to the year used in the
estimation (|q − k|). Notice that this is dependent on the assumption that δ 6= 0. If
there was no serial correlation in transitory income the plim would be identical to (4)
with α = 1, so using a year outside childhood would pick-up none of the impact of
transitory income.20 The result is that in this model higher autocorrelation can actually
play a positive role of sorts with respect to capturing the importance of the transitory
component.21
4.2.2 Income earned inside childhood
Assuming that we do have access to childhood income, using any one year of it in
our regression will produce an estimate with the probability limit given below (the
derivation of this result, and subsequent ones, is provided in the Appendix).












Using childhood income means that the impact of the white noise term (v0 ) for
the particular year used becomes part of the calculated coefﬁcient. Note in addition
that the ‘k’ in this case will be different from the ‘k’ in (7) - it will be closer to child-
hood income and (based on our assumption of equal importance for those years) the
second term in (8) will be larger than the equivalent term in (7). To give an idea of
the relative importance of the various components of income, Mazumder (2003) sug-


















The difference between (7) and (8) implies a testable prediction of our alternative
model: estimates of the intergenerational correlation based on within-childhood in-
come should be higher than those using non-childhood income. At least one paper in
the literature has made such a comparison (Behrman and Taubman, 1990), ostensibly
to test for credit market constraints, and found that mobility was generally lower (that
is, the IGE was higher) when estimated using childhood income - as predicted by our
model. (We test this implication more thoroughly in section 6).
Two recommendations follow from this for empirical work using single-year esti-
mation procedures:
1. Ideally use income earned during childhood,
2. If this is not feasible at least try to use a year that is as close to childhood as
possible. The extent to which the calculated coefﬁcient picks-up the impact of
20Note however that even if δ is, for instance, 0.5, if the year in question is more than ten years away from
childhood δ|q−k| u 0. We make use of this fact in section 6.
21Thoughonceonetakesaveragesanadditionalattenuationeffectduetotheserialcorrelation-represented
by α - enters this model as it did in the standard one; see section 4.3, equation (9).
12transitory income will depend on its distance in years from the childhood ones,
and the size of δ.
4.3 Estimation of IGE Using Multi-Year Averages of Parental In-
come
As a result of the increased awareness of the attenuation bias problem few authors now
use only a single year of parental income to estimate the IGE. Rather, the preferred
method is to use an average of parental income over as many years as is feasible.22.
In this section, we characterise the probability limit of the coefﬁcient in the seemingly
ideal case where we have data on all years of childhood income and we use an average
of these as our explanatory variable. In actual fact, the plim for the coefﬁcient on multi-
year averages varies depending on the nature of the overlap between the years used and
the years of childhood. However, in the same vein as the results above for single year
measures, since we expect the coefﬁcient to be highest where we use the maximum
amount of childhood income data we restrict ourselves to this case for the purpose of
exposition.23
If we estimate the IGE using an average of all childhood income, the probability
limit of the coefﬁcient can be expressed as follows:



























T − δT − 1 + δT
T(1 − δ)2

r is the earliest year used in the regression and m the latest - in the particular case
analysed here these correspond to the ﬁrst and last years of childhood respectively (see
Appendix for full details).
It is not easy to see what this expression implies for the estimated intergenerational
correlation coefﬁcient relative to its true value. If the true IGE were represented by ρ+ P
βq then using an average of all childhood income would understimate the coefﬁcient





an average of childhood income as the independent variable will likely overestimate
the true coefﬁcient. In the next section we use Monte Carlo simulations to show this
for certain parameter values. This can however be seen directly from (9), by noting
22Note that in many cases it may not be desirable to use the maximum number of years available because
of the reduction this causes in sample size
23Let K and Q represent the sets indexing the years used in the average, and the years of childhood
respectively. Then there are seven possible types of overlap that are relevant for the calculations. The ﬁrst
three are where K ⊂ Q,K ⊃ Q, or K = Q. The other four are for the case where K ∩ Q = 0, and
K ∩ Q 6= 0. The expression in (9) in fact cover cases 2 and 3.
13that for the parameter values cited in 4.2.2, and δ = 0.5, we will have plim ˆ B∗ =
ρc1 +
P
q βqc2; where c1 u 0.95 and 1.518 / c2 / 2.087. So that the overall IGE
may be substantially overestimated (depending on the magnitude of the βq).
4.4 The Lubotsky-Wittenberg (LW) Estimator
Another method for estimating the IGE is that proposed by Lubotsky and Wittenberg
(2006). They propose a new method of utilising multiple proxy variables, which in-
volves weighting the coefﬁcients of the various proxies derived from a simple OLS
regression in which they are the explanatory variables for the dependent variable of
interest. The optimality of this approach is demonstrated under particular conditions,
one of which is that the proxies do not belong in the structural equation.24
Of the two applications of this technique in their paper, one involves the calculation
of the effect of family income on children’s reading comprehension scores. The objec-
tive of using the LW estimator in that instance is to reduce the noise in the independent
variable - which in the structural model is permanent family income - in such a way
that accounts for the variation in this noise (i.e. relative magnitude of the variance due
to transitory factors) in earnings over the life-cycle, and which is therefore optimal.25
The parameter is estimated using a three-step procedure:
1. Regress test scores separately on each individual year of family income, and
calculate a set of weights for each measure (proxy) by dividing each estimated
coefﬁcient by the largest such value estimated.
2. Run a multiple regression of test scores on all the proxies entered seperately.
3. Weight the multiple regression coefﬁcient for each proxy by the weight calcu-
lated for it in stage 1, sum over all proxies and divide by the average of the
weights.
Using this method the authors ﬁnd a substantially higher coefﬁcient: “Using family
income when the mother is 22 to 39, the effect from using the optimally weighted co-
efﬁcients is 2.2, compared to only 1.6 when income is averaged prior to the regression,
an increase of 31%.” (Lubotsky and Wittenberg, 2006: 558). Since the measurement
error problem here is similar to the one we would face if we were trying to calculate
the IGE (in which case the dependent variable would just be a measure of children’s
income), the method used should, ceteris paribus, give a more accurate measure of this
coefﬁcient too. 26
The key point the authors make is that the LW estimator is a better estimator than
that which averages income prior to the regression (which, as we have seen, is the
norm), or that which utilises a multiple regression and takes a simple average of the
estimated coefﬁcients. Were we using the standard model of Section 3, and there was
life-cycle noise in the data, the LW estimator would certainly be better. But notice that
24See Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) for the full technical details.
25The premise being that the earnings in earlier years are a more noisy measure of permanent income than
later ones; an assumption widely accepted within the literature.
26We say ‘similar’ rather than ‘identical’ since there are arguably other children’s outcomes important for
their future income which will be affected differently by income as a causal factor, as well as being related
to the permanent factors proxied by the permanent component of income to a different degree.
14our alternative model implies that one of the assumptions of the procedure is violated
- namely the assumption, mentioned above, that the proxies do not have a direct effect
on the dependent variable.
Nevertheless, we might still wonder what the nature of the LW estimate would be
in this case and whether it would be an improvement on the other approaches. As it
happens we can use the results above to give an idea. In particular, the weight (‘p’)




Where ˆ βj comes from estimating y1it = βjy0ij + e, and similarly for ˆ βi which is here
assumed to be the largest estimated coefﬁcient so that we set ˆ pi = 1.
Using our previous result from (8) we can show that














q βqδ|q−i| + βiσ2
V0
(10)
In words: On the assumption that equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) are valid, the LW
estimator will weight the multiple regression coefﬁcients on the individual years of
childhood income by their relative importance (βj in the numerator versus βi in the





q βqδ|q−i|). On the basis of this one might therefore expect
that if transitory income matters the LW estimator will be closer to the true IGE, and
therefore higher than estimates based on the typical approaches outlined above. We
conﬁrm the latter intuition in our Monte Carlo simulations in Section 5. However,
given our discussion in 4.1 regarding the true IGE under our alternative model, closer
inspection suggests that the WL estimator is likely to overestimate the true IGE since
this is comprised of the average of each year’s β - not a weighted average. Section 5
conﬁrms this intuition as well.
4.5 Better Estimation Methods?
The implications - outlined above - of using different approaches to estimating the IGE
suggest that, if transitory income matters, past estimates may be ﬂawed.27 Given this,
there are two things we wish to do:
• Characterise the nature of the problem (under- or over-estimation) and the ex-
tent of it. In this way we may make some inference about the validity of past
estimates.
• Determine a more accurate alternative to the approaches used to date.
27Note that here we are concerned only with estimating the correct magnitude of the IGE. The equally
important issue of the IGE’s true composition in terms of permanent and transitory income, which is the
other concern of this paper, is deferred for the moment.
15Leaving issues of data availability aside, one might think that using an average of all





Indeed, in the context of the standard model of Section 3, accepting the notion that
permanent income can be equated to average lifetime income (as assumed for instance
by Mazumder (2003, 2005a)) implies that using such an average as the explanatory
variable will capture the true IGE. Our redeﬁnition of the coefﬁcient of interest as being
ρ∗ rather than ρ, as well as the result in (9) suggests however that this intuition may
be ﬂawed. An alternative would be to explicitly exploit the fact that transitory income
outside childhood plays no role in the structural equation for children’s permanent
income. For instance, one could run a regression on all years of childhood income
entered as individual regressors, along with an average of all non-childhood income.
We expect that that the coefﬁcient on the latter in a simple regression will be akin to
that in (9), but with the second term in the numerator being relatively small and the
third being equal to zero.28 This suggests that entering it into the multiple regression
would provide an effective control for ρ, thereby allowing us to estimate
P
q βq (and
therefore, by simple division, the average of this sum).
It is perhaps worth mentioning at this point that in this paper we ignore attempts to
instrument for permanent income (see for instance Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992).
We do so because it should be fairly clear that the use of instrumental variables will
not resolve the problem that results from the exclusion of transitory income from the
estimated model. 29
In the next section we examine the merits of the speculative solutions presented
above, using Monte Carlo simulations, and conﬁrm, for various parameter values, the
earlier assertions in this section regarding the bias that may result from using the con-
ventional estimation approaches.
5 Simulation Methodology and Results
For the purposes of this paper we ﬁx all parameters in our simulations except for the
relative importance of permanent and transitory factors, and the relative magnitude of


















= 0.5 and δ = 0.5.30 In addition, we will assume that





The simulations work as follows: First, we generate lifetime incomes (over 45years)
for 10,000 hypothetical parents. The ﬁrst year is generated by taking draws for the
permanent, serially correlated and white noise components from normal distributions
in such a way that the variance in annual income explained by the components corre-
sponds to the parameter values above. The subsequent years of income are generated
28The reason for this is apparent in the derivation of that result - see the Appendix.
29The very premise of instrumenting in this context is that there is one underlying latent variable - perma-
nent income - which is the sole variable of interest. This presumption is precisely what we dispute in this
paper.
30Solon (1999) makes similar assumptions.
16based on this one, incorporating the fact that w0 is correlated across years. We then
generate one year of children’s income (for 10,000 children) as a function of the per-
manent component of parental income (y0) and the deviations from this in individual
years of parental income from childhood (z0q). The former is weighted by our assumed
value for ρ and the latter by our assumed values for the βq’s, which for the ﬁrst of these
simulations are assumed to be equal so that if
P
q βq = X, then βq = X
21,∀q (we relax
this assumption somewhat in two subsequent simulations). Note that in all simulations
we assume that childhood lasts 21years.
Thisprovidesuswithasetofdatasatisyingtheassumptionsofouralternativemodel.
Having done this we then run a set of regressions on the generated data. The ﬁrst set of
these are aimed at giving a numerical characterisation of the bias that results from what
were until recently the most popular approaches to estimating the IGE. The second
set explore approaches based on subsequent developments (Mazumder, 2005b; Lubot-
sky and Wittenberg, 2006), as well as possible alternatives discussed in the previous
section. Each is iterated 10,000 times.31.
The results of our estimations are shown in Table 1. This reports the results of re-
gressions of children’s income on: 1. A single year of parental income from far (twenty
years) outside childhood, 2. A ﬁve-year average of income outside of childhood, 3. A
single year of income earned in the middle of childhood and, 4. A ﬁve-year average
from mid-childhood.32 Recall that in all cases the true coefﬁcient is 0.5.
The results conﬁrm the well-known fact that the coefﬁcient on the permanent com-
ponent is heavily attenuated when using single-year measures of parental income, and
as Mazumder (2005b) has demonstrated, even averages (of non-childhood income at
least) using ﬁve years of income substantially understimate the true coefﬁcient. In the
context of the model proposed in this paper it is particularly notable that there is a strik-
ing difference between the coefﬁcients estimated using a single year of childhood, and
non-childhood, income; with the latter being lower as expected. (If the magnitude of
the former coefﬁcient appears implausible it may be worth noting that Solon estimated
coefﬁcients on single years of income as high as 0.4 (Solon, 1992: Table 3), as did
Zimmerman (Zimmerman, 1992: Table 3: 418)).
For the ﬁrst parameter set, using one year of non-childhood income underestimates
the true IGE by about 65%, whereas using a year within childhood underestimates
it by slightly more than 20%. The results for the ﬁve-year averages are similar, and
the estimated coefﬁcients for the second parameter set indicate that the extent of the
difference depends inversely on the magnitude of the betas. Whilst this demonstrates
the dangers of using non-childhood income, even utilising income from childhood in
this way does not necessarily yield a good approximation of the true IGE. The results
31The Stata .do ﬁles are available from the author on request
32In the second regression the average begins ten years outside childhood (s=31) and ﬁnishes four years
hence (s=35). The reason for noting this detail is that since 0 < δ < 1, we can assume that the second
term in the numerator of (7) will effectively equal zero if |q − k| > 10,∀k. This serves to accentuate the
difference between using childhood and non-childhood income since the latter picks-up none of the salience
of transitory income.
17for the last two parameter sets indicate that the relative importance of different periods
in childhood is almost as important as whether the income is from childhood at all.33
For this reason we turn to the second set of estimation approaches. These regress
the child’s income on: 5. An average of all childhood income, 6. An average of all
non-childhood parental income, 7. An average of all parental income. 8. Calculates
the Lubotsky-Wittenberg estimator discussed in Section 4.4, and 9. and 10. contain the
outputs from regressing the child’s income on all years of childhood income entered
separately whilst controlling for an average of all non-childhood income. (9. contains
the summed coefﬁcients of the individual years whilst 10. gives the coefﬁcient on the
control).
The results in row 5 merely conﬁrm our counter-intuitive, analytically-derived con-
clusion of Section 4 that using an average of all childhood income may overestimate
the true IGE for certain parameter values. By contrast, using a full (twenty-year) av-
erage of non-childhood income underestimates the IGE by 25-40% depending on the
importance of transitory income. Conﬁrming our concerns about the approaches advo-
cated by Mazumder (2005b) and Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) respectively, row 7.
shows that using an average of all parental income may underestimate the IGE. On the
other hand, 8. shows that the Lubotsky-Wittenberg estimator may provide spuriously
inﬂated estimates of the IGE if transitory parental income does matter for children’s
permanent income.34 Finally, the results in row 9. and 10. are not particularly promis-
ing. The sum of the coefﬁcients on the individual years of childhood income is clearly
capturing the sum of the betas (equal to 4.2, or 2.1 for the second parameter set) but
only to a relatively small degree, whilst the coefﬁcient on the control overestimates ρ
and understimates the true IGE.
These simulations do help us to characterise the nature of the bias for various ap-
proaches, but no obvious solution emerges. At best we can say that - for plausible
parameter values - the true IGE is bounded below by estimates based on averages over
all years of parental income, and above by those over only parental income earned dur-
ing childhood. In an empirical setting this fact provides another test of the alternative
model: if adding a number of years of non-childhood income to an average initially
only over childhood decreases the coefﬁcient, this supports the claim that transitory
income matters.35 We discuss this possibility further in the next section.
The fundamental point that emerges is that if transitory income matters all existing
estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income are biased in ways dependent
on:
• The extent to which they have utilised income from childhood
• The relative importance of transitory income (i.e. the magnitude of the betas)
33As noted in the table header, the βi for the thrid parameter set start at 0.4 and then decline to 0, whereas
for the fourth set they start at 0 and then increase to 0.4. The years used in the average are the ﬁrst ﬁve years
of childhood - hence the large difference in the estimated coefﬁcients.
34This is not to suggest that the results in Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) are necessarily spurious, but
it does indicate that there may be another factor at play other than the life-cycle noise with which they are
concerned.
35Notice that this holds most strongly for the addition of many more years of non-childhood income.
186 Empirical Evidence
6.1 Data
In this section we examine the implications of the alternative model empirically. Our
data source is the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
dataset (Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2007a), which has been one of the primary
sources of intergenerational mobility data in the literature.36 The PSID is an ongoing,
nationally representative, longitudinal survey of households in the United States that
has been conducted annually since 1968 and bi-annually since 1997. It began with
4,800 families and has subsequently conducted follow-up surveys with these families
and individuals who moved out to form their own households. Because of the addition
of newly-formed households to the sample, by 2001 it had grown to 7,000 families.37
In this way it provides excellent data on intergenerational income mobility which is
unavailable from cross-sectional surveys, as we have access to the income data of both
children and their parents over a substantial period.
With such a survey, sample attrition is inevitably a concern. For the purposes of
this study we take the data at face value, and make no pre-analysis adjustments in
this or any other respect (though we do use the relevant weights provided with the
PSID data). Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Mofﬁtt (1998a,b) have conducted a thorough
analysis of attrition in the PSID. Although it had lost almost 50% of its original sample
through attrition by 1989, Fitzgerald et al. (1998a) ﬁnd that despite this it has retained
“continued cross-sectional representativeness” (1998a: 296) for the ﬁrst generation
of respondents. The same authors’ analysis of the affect of attrition on the second
generation of respondents Fitzgerald et al. (1998b) has more measured conclusions as
to whether this attrition is likely to bias the estimates of intergenerational relationships.
This is in part due to the limitations placed on their analysis by having to estimate
attrition effects within the sample itself (since there is no comparable survey against
which to check these ﬁgures), which leads them to state that: “All that we can conclude
is that our analysis has not uncovered evidence of statistically signiﬁcant attrition bias
in estimates of the intergenerational relationship between fathers’ and sons’ earnings”
(1998b: 336). The ﬁnding therefore cannot be taken as categorically demonstrating
that attrition bias is not likely to be a problem. However, for the purposes of this study
we suggest that it should not be a problem for two reasons:
• We wish to contrast our results with those in the literature, most of which have
been derived from similarly raw data
• Our primary interest is not the magnitude of the IGE per se but the composition
of this ﬁgure and the trends within it, which - given their nature - we suggest are
less likely to be distorted by non-random attrition (see discussion in 6.3).
We therefore attempt no corrections for attrition other than the use of the PSID-
provided weights.
36It is such a popular source for intergenerational mobility analyses that the PSID Datcentre recently
released a full tutorial on their website which guides the reader through the - somewhat arduous - process of
compiling an interegenerational dataset (Chiteji, Gouskova and Stafford, 2007).
37In fact, it had grown to more than 8,500 families in 1996 but the sample was subsequently reduced (see
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2007b).
19We do nevertheless restrict our sample of parent-child pairs in two ways. First, we
use only father-son pairs. Second, the pairs are limited to those in which the child was
younger than 20 in 1968 (including those not yet born), and older than 25 in the year in
which we require their income data. The ﬁrst restriction is not ideal - since if income
plays a causal role our primary variable of interest should be all household income - but
we make it in order to avoid complications relating to women’s changing role in society
and the details of marriage markets. The second is so that we have children’s income
measured during a period outside any reasonable conception of childhood (which also
means less noise in that income data), whilst also ensuring that we have some parental
income data that is certainly within childhood. All income data is converted to 2003
dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) provided by the United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
FIGURE 1. SAMPLE SIZES OF PARENTAL INCOME BY AGE OF SON
The samples sizes - by the age of the sons when father’s income was earned - are
provided in Figure 1. Note that the nature of the sample attrition is due both to the
inherent limitations of the PSID sample as well as the above restrictions. For instance,
if children are 30 in 1997 then they were only born in 1967 and we will not have any
pre-childhood information on them (since the PSID started in 1968). More generally,
if we use 1997 income then we will only have more than ﬁve years of pre-childhood
parental income for those children who were newborns in or after the 1972 PSID and
whose fathers reported their income. But since these children must be at least 25 years
old in 1997 they have to have been born before 1972. Thus, if we use 1997 data we
will not have more than ﬁve years of pre-childhood income data on any individuals.
We have much more data on late childhood, and post-childhood, income for analogous
reasons.
In order to maximise the sample available we utilise 2001 data, which yields the
sample sizes shown in Figure 1. We did however run the estimations below using the
1997 data as a sensitivity test. The primary differences between the two sets of results
20are that the coefﬁcients on childhood years appear to be somewhat higher, and the
downward trend in later years is more pronounced, in the 1997 regressions.38 There
is a possibility that this could be due to the inclusion of more individuals in their mid-
twenties in the sample who were initially below the age cut-off in 1997, though the
quartics in age we use should account for such life-cycle biases. Nevertheless, the
results below do not appear importantly sensitive to our choice of year.
6.2 Results
Recall that our main objective in this section is to investigate the role of transitory
parental income matters for children’s future permanent income. Based on our deriva-
tions and discussion in 4.2 we do this by estimating the elasticity of son’s income in
2001 with respect to father’s income earned at different ages of the son. The output is
presented in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. SINGLE-YEAR IGE ESTIMATES
The smallest sample size we use is 96 (when the sons are 40) and the largest is 960
(when they are 19). The results appear to strongly support a causal role for income.
The single-year IGEs using father’s income more than two years before birth and when
the son is in his mid- and late-30s are of a similar magnitude to those found in some
of the earliest calculations of this variable (Behrman and Taubman, 1985), whilst they
are highest - as much as 0.47 - when using income from early childhood. The magni-
tude and pattern of these differences cohere with the assertion that whilst IGEs based
on income outside of childhood capture the (attenuated) import of the permanent com-
ponent of income, they fail to capture the causal importance of income (transitory or
permanent).
Recall that one of our parameter sets in the previous sections included a case where
the betas where highest (0.4) at birth and decreasing linearly thereafter. It is interesting
38The 1997 results are available from the author.
21to compare the graph in Figure 3 of the single-year IGEs for those 10,000 replications
to our empirical estimates here.39
FIGURE 3. IGE ESTIMATES FROM SIMULATIONS WITH A DOWNWARD
LINEAR TREND IN BETAS
The few authors in the literature to attempt an assessment of the causal role of in-
come (discussed in 8.2) have typically used comparisons of IGEs based on multi-year
averages rather than single years of parental income. Consequently, in Figure 4 we
provide IGE estimates based on ﬁve-year averages, ordered by the earliest year used in
the average.
39An unexpected result is that the ﬁrst year of childhood income in the simulations is not the one with the
highest coefﬁcient, despite the fact that in the data generating process it carried the highest coefﬁcient value
of 0.4. The reason for this is because as we noted in Section 4, it is both the importance of a given year as
well as its proximity to years of importance that will determine the magnitude of the estimated coefﬁcient.
The simulation result may be partly due to our artiﬁcal censoring of that distribution, however it does suggest
that the lesser magnitude of the coefﬁcient on years of, and immediately after, birth in our empirical analysis
may be slightly misleading. Coefﬁcients on years at either end of the causal range for parental income are
likely to be downward-biased relative to other years in that range.
22FIGURE 4. IGE ESTIMATES USING FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES
Although these results also appear to demonstrate that income in early childhood
is most important, the magnitudes of the differences are substantially reduced.40 The
alternative model of Section 4 would suggest that this is due on the one hand to the
decreased attenuation of the permanent component (ρ), combined with a smoothing of
the coefﬁcient on transitory income (βq in year q) by virtue of averaging the betas over
multiple years. Quite clearly, this approach is more likely to refute the notion that:
a. Income matters more in some periods than others; b. On the basis of this, that
transitory income has any causal role whatsoever.
6.3 Estimation Concerns
One might be concerned that our results in Figure 2 are driven by the sample attrition
shown in Figure 1. If this attrition is systematic it could bias the individual estimates,
and therefore also any comparisons of these, by life-cycle trends in income over the
age of the child. Indeed this may be a valid concern; since fathering a child is more
likely at some ages than others and fathers’ income is known to be prone to such life-
cycle effects, we would expect something of a correlation. By this theory it is not
surprising to ﬁnd that income falls as one measures it well before childhood or long
after childhood. This is one reason to control for a quartic in the age of fathers, which
we do in our estimations. One might also be concerned that there may be selection
effects amongst children since only children born in certain years will have particular
years of income (e.g. two years before birth) available. To control for this also we
include a quartic in children’s age.41
However, this does not fully deal with the problem. It may be that the coefﬁcients
are declining as they do because our samples are getting progressively homogenous,
40The shorter range of these estimates is due to the reduction in sample size that results from requiring a
continuous ﬁve years of parental income data.
41This is equivalent to controlling for the child’s year of birth.
23so that our estimations are suffering from the attenuation bias noted by Solon (1989).42
To allay this fear we might like to make a detailed comparison of the sub-samples by
variables such as race, gender, education level, etc. Another way of making such an
assessment though is to make comparisons within 5-year intervals of notable changes
in the IGE for a ﬁxed sample. (The PSID sample does not allow us to ﬁx a sample
of sufﬁcient size to make this comparison over much longer periods). We conduct
analysis on such subsets and ﬁnd broadly similar results (not shown) in terms of the
trends, although the magnitude of the coefﬁcients from the subsets differs at times
from that in the full-sample estimations - as one might expect given that the factors
inﬂuencing the IGE can vary over time (see the discussion in 8.1).
Perhaps the best way of allaying concerns that our results are due to biases resulting
from sample selection, is to consider the pattern in Figure 1. If the results in Figure
2 were driven by increasing sample homogeneity due to age-based ‘attrition’ in our
sample then we would expect the highest IGEs to be associated with the largest sample
sizes. However, whilst the sample sizes peak at age 19, the single-year IGEs peak at the
age of 3. On the basis of all these arguments we reject the possibility that our results
are driven by biases; either relating to life-cycle effects or homogenous sub-samples.
7 Discussion
The results above are consistent with a number of plausible hypotheses:
• That parents who plan their children are likely to have children who are better off
(reﬂected by the importance of parental income up to three years before birth),
over and above the fact that this is an attribute typically associated with higher
income brackets.
• That parental income during childhood generally matters more than income out-
side of childhood.
• And that, consistent with the early childhood development literature, income
appears to matter more in the early stages of childhood.43
7.1 The Direction of Averaging
There is one important prediction of the model presented in section 4, and discussed in
previous sections, that we are unable to test here because of our small sample sizes. By
virtue of the fact that childhood income matters more than non-childhood income, the
trend in the IGE when the independent variable is averaged over longer periods of time
should depend on the direction of the averaging. Consider Figure 5 reproduced from
Mazumder (2001).44
42As discussed previously, this results from using unrepresentatively homogenous samples to calculate the
IGE.
43As we have noted previously, these hypotheses are likely to be different for a country with a lower
level of development. In that case one might expect that income around the period of birth would be most
important, and perhaps also income at the age of ﬁrst school attendance.
44(Mazumder, 2001: Figure 3)
24FIGURE 5. DIRECTION OF MAZUMDER’S AVERAGING
We would expect that the shape of the plotted line will depend on the ﬁrst year
used as well as the order of the subsequent years. For instance, if one were to begin
with a year of parental income after childhood and then include more years from earlier
in life we would expect the slope to be steeper than if the ﬁrst year was from within
childhood and some of the subsequent years were not. Notice that under the crude
permanent income approach it should not matter which years are included, or in what
order, since the increase in the coefﬁcient should be solely due to decreased attenaution
bias.45
One reason this might not emerge from an analysis such as Mazumder’s is that -
as we have noted - authors rarely pay attention to the age of the child when income
was earned, but tend rather to focus on the age of the adult. Although there is a de-
mographic relation between the two, it’s not clear ex ante what form this will take.
There are some cases where one can infer the age of children for the particular years
being used. This is true of both Solon(1992) and Zimmerman(1992). The former’s
choice of cohort and years of parental income means that for the ﬁrst year his sample is
aged 8-16years, becoming 12-20years by the last year used. One cannot be as speciﬁc
about Zimmerman’s sample, except to say that the average age in the ﬁrst year used
is 18 (Zimmerman, 1992: 416) becoming 23 in the last. In both authors’ analyses of
the intergenerational relation between fathers’ and sons’ wages, the magnitude of the
individual-year coefﬁcients decreases as later years of parental income are used.46 Be-
cause of their approach, this coincides with these years moving (for some of the sample
at least) outside of childhood - which is precisely the result our model would predict.
The broader point is that to test whether the direction of averaging matters, years
must be ordered by the age of observation; that is, ordered by the age of the child when
45We are implicitly assuming here that any biases due to other factors - such as life-cycle effects - have
been satisfactorily dealt with.
46(Solon, 1992: 401) and (Zimmerman, 1992: Table 3, 418). One should add the caveat that the decrease
is not wholly uniform, and the pattern in Zimmerman’s results using other measures such as log hourly
earnings is quite different.
25the parental income was earned. And to do this comprehensively for a long period
will likely require access to social security and income tax datasets of the kind used by
Mazumder (2005b), and Corak and Heisz (1999).
7.2 Determining the Magnitude of the Betas
In addition to demonstrating that transitory income matters, we would also like to as-
certain just how much it matters. In particular, what proportion of the true IGE is due
to transitory income and what proportion is due to permanent income? To answer this
we may turn to the derivations in section 4. In particular, note that if we use a year of
income from well outside childhood the resulting coefﬁcient will not pick up any of the
impact of transitory income. However, it should, ceteris paribus pick-up as much of
the effect of permanent income as a year in childhood. Hence if we subtract the former
coefﬁcient from the latter (equation (8) minus equation (4) with T=1), we get only the
attenuated effect of transitory income as shown below.47
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all the betas are of the same individual magnitude, the the term on the right-hand side
approximately equals the true beta of the childhood year in question. In the event that
some years are more important than others - as the data suggests - this approach will
underestimate the magnitude of the largest betas and overestimate it for the smaller
ones. For our estimates we may therefore put the range of the betas conservatively at
somewhere between 0.05 (in the late teens and early 20s) and 0.25 (in early childhood).
The contribution to the total IGE is equal to the average of the betas and appears to be
in the order of about 0.11. Thus about 20% of the intergenerational elasticity in the
United States over this period is due to transitory income.48
7.3 Policy Considerations
The implications of these ﬁndings go beyond transitory income. It should be clear from
all the preceding analysis that if transitory income matters for children’s outcomes and
later income, we may use variation in single-year income elasticities (the IGEs) to as-
certain whether income is more important at some ages than others. If only permanent
incomematteredthiswouldbeimpossiblesince-inthecrudeversionofthishypothesis
- permanent income by deﬁnition is constant over the lifecycle. Notice that even though
we could not test this using income, that would not preclude the empirical possibility
that differences in permanent income could matter more at some ages than others.49
47As emphasised already, this does rely importantly on the assumption that the non-childhood years are
well outside childhood. The closer they are to childhood the more likely it is that the correlation in the
transitory component will mask differences between years.
48This assumes a true IGE of 0.5. As noted earlier, the accuracy of IGEs calculated by the likes of
Mazumder will depend on a number of factors and could be either over- or under-estimates.
49If that were the case, testing this would require analysing the importance of certain childhood outcomes
- likely to be affected by differences in permanent income - for their future permanent income. Which to
some degree is what Cameron and Heckman (2001) do in their analysis of children’s educational outcomes.
26What transitory implies about permanent
It is possible, however, to make inferences about the varying importance of permanent
income from the varying importance of transitory income. If transitory income matters
more at a particular age then it is very likely that, to the extent that permanent income
has a direct causal role, it too will be more important at such ages. In fact, one would
expect that the consumption of goods which importantly inﬂuence children’s outcomes
will be higher from permanent income than it is from transitory income. Therefore one
expects that the former will be at least as important as the latter.
We should therefore clarify a point about our two examples in Section 2 relating to
education and malnutrition. If parents only consume from the permanent component of
their income, and the purchase of education and nutrition affects children’s outcomes,
then it will be true that differences in income matter more at the respective periods
of childhood but not that transitory income matters. Those examples are intended to
illustrate some extreme situations in which income might matter in a causal way at
a particular period. If the notion of permanent income in the mobility literature was
conceptualised in a more sophisticated way - ` a la Friedman, as discussed in Section 2 -
then the argument for the salience of transitory income might be less persuasive. Since
they are not, and the literature on the components of longitudinal income takes a similar
approach, we argue that transitory income conceptualised in this way is important.
From a policy perspective, the implications may go beyond income itself.50 Since
it appears that the causal effects of income are greater at some ages rather than oth-
ers, policy interventions need not take the form of income transfers but can instead
be targeted at important developmental factors in those years (such as attendance at
pre-school). Indeed, direct interventions of this sort may be more efﬁcacious (not to
mention being easier to sell to sceptical taxpayers).
There is an important caveat to these comments. Implicitly we are assuming that the
relationship between transitory income and the consumption of goods that inﬂuence
children’s outcomes is ﬁxed. Although not an unreasonable assumption, if wrong it
could affect any policy conclusions and we should therefore be a little circumspect.
For instance: If the goods that inﬂuence children’s development in early childhood are
more responsive to transitory income than those in later childhood, then it could seem
that income is not causally important in later childhood; whereas in fact it is only tran-
sitory income that this is true of, and there may still be a case for policy interventions.
As an example, there could be thresholds that determine certain important develop-
mental experiences such as college attendance. If transitory income is insufﬁcient in
magnitude to take families over some such thresholds, then it may appear - and will in-
deed be the case - that transitory income does not matter in these periods, even though
the decisions taken in those periods may have great impact on future outcomes and be
income sensitive.
50Note that in this section we are implicitly presuming a model of human capital accumulation of the kind
outlined by Case, Lubotsky and Paxson (2002). Whilst this is arguably the most plausible explanation for the
empirically-demonstrated importance of transitory income, the mechanical nature of our model in section 4
means that we cannot prove this assertion conclusively.
278 Further Issues and Extensions
8.1 The Empirical Importance of Social Context:
Developing vs. Developed Countries
The preceding sections provide support for the alternative model presented in section
4, and suggest a number of ways in which it could be tested using longer data sources
in order to reach a more categorical conclusion. Although we hypothesise that the dif-
ferences between IGEs calculated using this model and the standard model are likely
to be signiﬁcant in most cases, it is important to note that this will vary across soci-
eties. As is well known in the literature on intergenerational moblity, more developed
societies in which there is substantial public provision of healthcare, education and
other social services will be ones in which the importance of income of both a transi-
tory and permanent nature is mitigated. Furthermore, such societies are likely to have
better credit markets which are accessible to a greater proportion of the population,
and be characterised by employment opportunities of a less volatile nature than in less
developed societies. The result is that we would expect the bias arising from the stan-
dard model’s exclusion of transitory income in the estimated equation for children’s
permanent income to be greater in less developed societies.
Indeed, although both Mayer (1998) and Shea (2000) argue that parental income is
not an important causal factor for children’s economic success in the United States,
they acknowledge that:
1. This may be due in large part to the presence of “programs such as Food Stamps,
housing subsidies, and Medicaid (which) have helped most American families
meet their basic material needs” (Mayer, 1998: 148).
2. As a result the conclusions might be very different in less developed countries.
Shea therefore notes that Duﬂo’s (2003) demonstration of the importance of pension
income for children’s outcomes in South Africa does not necessarily contradict his
ﬁndings since, “the impact of parental resources on children may be higher in devel-
oping countries than in the contemporary US, where public investments in schooling
and child health are relatively high” (Shea, 2000: 160). Or as Solon puts it: “the
steady-state intergenerational earnings elasticity depends positively on the strength of
the mechanical heritability of income-generating traits and the earnings return to hu-
man capital investment, and it varies inversely with the progressivity of government
investment in children’s human capital (for example, through public provision of edu-
cation or health care).”(Solon, 2002: 65, my emphasis).
A recent piece of work (Karlan and Zinman, 2007), also reported in the Economist
(2007), supports the notion that transitory income has a substantial impact in devel-
oping countries in the absence of credit. Karlan and Zinman ﬁnd that marginal loan
applicants whose applications were randomly approved were 19% less likely to be in
poverty 6-12months later than those whose applications were rejected. This despite
the fact that loans had to be repaid within 4months at an annual interest rate of 200%.
If transitory income can impact poverty levels to this degree it is quite plausible that
it thereby affects consumption of items that inﬂuence children’s outcomes and future
incomes.
28We emphasise the broader point for two reasons. The vast majority of datasets avail-
able for making detailed analyses of intergenerational moblity of the kind we have
been discussing are from highly developed countries. Whilst these present excellent
opportunities for testing and conﬁrming the theoretical assertions of this paper - as we
do with the PSID in the previous section - it is important to emphasise that the social
contexts these datasets represent are the ones in which the results from our alternative
model are least likely to differ from those of the standard model. Nevertheless, it is
important to emphasise - as we did in sections 2 and 4 - that the alternative model is
theoretically superior to the simplistic permanent income model, requiring as it does
fewer initial restrictions on the process of intergenerational tranfer. For that reason
alone we argue that the former is simply the more correct way to conceptualise the
IGE. The second reason is that, as data becomes available, researchers attempting to
estimate the IGE in developing countries should be particularly cautious when drawing
conclusions from estimates based on methods associated with the standard model. As
demonstrated in section 5, these could be substantially biased in either direction.51
8.2 The Importance of the Age of Observation
One of the primary motivating factors for the proposal that transitory income matters
was that it seems plausible to believe that parental income may be more or less impor-
tant for children’s outcomes depending on when it is earned (recall our two extreme
examples in section 2). This was the reason that we ﬁrst used βq rather than simply
β in (6) to characterise the importance of transitory factors for childhood income. In
Section 5 two sets of simulations were constructed to incorporate a simpliﬁed version
of this possibility, and in section 6 we attempted to explore the matter empirically. Our
results, presented in Figure 2 and 3 - seem to provide strong support for this hypoth-
esis. Other authors - some also using the PSID - have reached different conclusions
however. In this subsection we examine the reasons for the difference.
Within the existing framework there appear to have been at least three attempts - by
Mayer (1998), Case et al. (2002) and Hertz (2005) - in the literature to assess whether
there is some difference in the importance of parental income at different ages of the
child. Hertz (2005) estimates the IGE using three-year averages of family income
taken at different ages of childhood (1-3years, 4-6years up to 16-18years), and further
compares these over a period of 25years (1950-1975). Although there are clearly dif-
ferences (sometimes substantial) between the estimates within a given year, no obvious
pattern emerges. (Mayer, 1998: 72-75) also makes an attempt at assessing something
akin to the effect of the age at which income is earned, by testing the null hypothesis
that increasing parental income over childhood has a beneﬁcial impact (controlling for
the actual level of income over the period). She ﬁnds the gradient to be insigniﬁcant in
her regressions and takes this as support for the assertion that ‘parental income doesn’t
matter’. Finally, Case et al. (2002) attempt to assess whether it is permanent or current
income that affects children’s health status. They do this by comparing the coefﬁcients
on averages of log income from different stages of childhood.52.
51South Africa, for instance, is just beginning its ﬁrst National Income Dynamics Study through the South
African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town. Within a
decade this will begin providing data with which we may make estimates of intergenerational mobility.
52In actual fact, it appears that the authors take logs of the averages rather than averages of the logs (Case
et al., 2002: Table 5: 1321)
29There are various problems with all these studies, stemming from the fact that none
have an alternative model which actually incorporates the transitory income whose ef-
fect they wish to test. Mayer’s approach is problematic in part because the structure
she imposes on the varying salience of transitory income is so restrictive. The linear
structure resembles the one constructed in our simulations in section 5 for illustrative
purposes. However, as we point out in Section 6, this seems unlikely to represent the
true pattern. Given our clearly non-linear graph in Section 6, it is therefore hardly
surprising that she ﬁnds no signiﬁcant result. In addition, it is not clear whether her es-
timation method of regressing children’s outcomes on the gradient of parental income,
whilst intuitively appealing, is econometrically valid.
By contrast, the assessment by Case et al. (2002: 1321-1322) is much more nuanced
in this respect. In ordered probits of health status they compare the coefﬁcients on
averages of household income from different periods of early childhood (0-3years, 4-
8years and 9-12years) as well as that on an average of income from 6years before birth.
Finding no statistically signiﬁcant difference between these they then compare the co-
efﬁcients on longer averages over: the child’s lifetime (6.29years on average); their
lifetime plus 6years before birth; their lifetime plus 9years before birth. In this case the
coefﬁcients on the second average are signiﬁcantly higher than on the ﬁrst, but do not
increase signiﬁcantly when three further years of pre-childhood income are included.
The authors take this as an indication that, “our measure of permanent income becomes
less noisy when we use these additional years of data” (Case et al., 2002: 1322). In
fact, however, none of these results are incompatible with the possibility of transitory
income being important for the outcomes under investigation.
To begin, note that the initial set of averages are taken over different lengths of time
- from three to ﬁve years - which strictly speaking makes them incomparable given the
effect this is likely to have on reducing the attenuation in the permanent component.
Furthermore, the one average that is taken outside of childhood is still relatively close
to that period. Equation (9) in section 4 demonstrates that, by virtue of the serial cor-
relation in the transitory component, mere proximity to years of importance can falsely
inﬂate the coefﬁcients on averages over less important years. In addition our results in
section 6 suggest that transitory income may be important up to three years before birth
(though in that case the importance need not be a causal one). Furthermore, the results
in the second set of estimations concur with the assertion in sections 4 and 6 (supported
by the results in section 5) that the direction of averaging matters. If it were true that
only permanent income mattered, then by Mazumder’s analysis discussed previously
there should be substantial beneﬁts to increasing the average beyond a length of only
twelve years.53 Under his model this holds true for income from any period. By con-
trast, if transitory income matters as we suggest, then adding years of non-childhood
income to an average which already contains a number of years from childhood may
have little effect and may even decrease the coefﬁcient.
ThesigniﬁcanceoftransitoryincomeisnotHertz’sexplicitinterest(thoughheseems
to believe that it does matter by indicating a preference for income earned whilst chil-
dren were resident in the household). Nevertheless, one part of his paper - reproduced
here as Figure 6 - is very similar to our analysis in section 6.
53This is actually the average length of the averages used by Case et al. (2002) because the children in the
sample were of different ages, but the broader point remains valid.
30FIGURE 6. HERTZ’S IGEs BY THE AGE OF OBSERVATION54
Hertz combines the calculation of the IGE using income from different stages of
childhood with a comparison of IGEs across time. In terms of the former it is hard to
see any consistent pattern within any given cohort - which contrasts with our results.
(He makes no assessment of the importance of non-childhood income and is there-
fore unable to consider whether income within childhood is more important than that
outside it).We suggest that there are two likely reasons for this:
• Dynamics and public policy: Due to changes in public policy and social structure
one expects - as per the discussion in 7.1 - there to have been changes in the
salience of income at different ages. As a result, the lack of a clear pattern
between cohorts over a twenty-ﬁve year period is probably misleading.
• Sample size: Whilst restricting the analysis to individual cohorts is appealing
as it deals with any concerns about variation - amongst these groups and over
time - it is highly detrimental to the sample size in the regressions (which is
precisely why we did not do this in section 6). Hertz notes that cohort sizes
themselves range from 300 to less than 100 but, as we found, these are typically
reduced substantially when the availability of income data is considered. Thus
one suspects that the noise in his estimates is just that.
The main point regarding all these studies is that to assess whether transitory income
matters it is preferable to compare coefﬁcients on years well outside childhood (prefer-
ably by at least ten years) to those within it. This broader issue should not be confused
54We reproduce here the top half of Hertz’s Figure 8. The second half simply adds a trendline based on
the average of all his estimates; since we are not interested in issues of dynamics here, we exclude this part.
31with assessing the relative importance of income at different periods in childhood,
which is a different - more complicated - matter.
8.3 Decomposing the Intergenerational Correlation
As noted in the Introduction, a primary concern of the current literature is with de-
composing the calculated intergenerational correlation in income; that is, determin-
ing the channels through which this correlation is being generated, and ascertaining
their relative importance.55 This can be done by estimating the relation between the
variable representing the channel of interest (years of schooling for instance) and chil-
dren’sincomeinamultipleregressionincludingvariablesrepresentingallhypothesised
channels, then multiplying this by the correlation between the channel and parental in-
come.56 By doing this we are breaking the IGC down into the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
effects of parental income.
Some channels which have received particular interest are those relating to the trans-
fer of genetic ability (generally using twin and/or sibling studies), educational attain-
ment and personality traits.57 A consensus has yet to emerge however on even these
three channels. For instance, Loehlin (2005) ﬁnds that personality traits explain little
of the correlation, whereas Mayer (2005) in the same volume suggests they do explain
a relatively large portion of it. In addition, some authors such as Grawe and Mulli-
gan (2002) - following the models of family investment and intergenerational transfer
of Becker and Tomes - emphasise the distinctive implications of economic models of
transmission, whilst others (see Goldberger, 1989; Bowles and Gintis, 2002) take a
more ‘mechanical’ approach.58
There is also a tendency to use analyses of these channels to infer the existence, or
importance, of a causal relationship between parental income and children’s outcomes
(and hence income). One example of this sort is Solon’s ﬁnding that the IGC only ex-
plains 0.16 of the 0.4 correlation between brothers’ incomes and therefore that “of the
40% or so of permanent earnings inequality that arises from the family and commu-
nity background factors shared by brothers, probably only a minority share is related
to parental income” (Solon, 1999: 1784). This argument is based on Solon’s decom-
position of the sibling correlation in earnings (1999: 1777, eq.21). But the logic is
potentiallly problematic because if the estimated IGC (0.4 in this example) is underes-
timated then it will be biased toward the conclusion that parental income per se is not
particulary important.59
55Again it is important to emphasise that we are talking of the generation of the correlation rather than
children’s outcomes, since if anything the majority view appears to shy away from the notion of a causal
relation.
56Where it is assumed that all variables are normalised. See Bowles and Gintis (2002) for a full discussion
of the details.
57See Solon (1999) for a survey of studies on sibling correlations in income and their relation to the
intergenerational correlation.
58“Unlike the models of parental and child behavior accounting for persistence pioneered by Becker and
presented in this issue by Grawe and Mulligan, our approach is more diagnostic, not giving an adequate
causal account of the transmission process, but indicating where to look to ﬁnd the causes.”(Bowles and
Gintis, 2002: 9-10).
59In fact, based on Solon’s decomposition, an IGC of 0.6 would explain (0.6)2 = 0.36 of the 0.4 corre-
lation between siblings leading to a very different conclusion.
32Furthermore, in this instance there may be an additional problem: that calculated
correlations in sibling income do pick-up the impact of transitory parental income to a
greater degree than the IGC to which they are compared, thereby increasing the like-
lihood that we underestimate the salience of parental income as a causal factor. Until
we have greater conﬁdence in our estimates of the IGC (or - as we have suggested - the
IGE) and, in particular, until we have accounted for the possible importance of tran-
sitory income it would be advisable to be somewhat cautious in the inferences drawn
from such comparisons.
8.4 Implications for Public Policy
There are a number of reasons why we should be interested in intergenerational mobil-
ity from a policy perspective. Perhaps the primary one is that we may be interested in
achieving, to the greatest degree possible, a society characterised by equal opportunity
(with the caveat noted in the Introduction). To the extent that a high IGE indicates a
failure in this regard it suggests the possible need for government intervention. The
main point made in the literature on this subject is that one can only determine whether
this is the case by decomposing the intergenerational relation into its constituent chan-
nels and making ethical determinations of their desirability. Swift (2005) puts forward
one set of criteria in this regard which, though they may seem extreme to some, are
appealing in as much as they take popular conceptions of what constitutes ‘fair’ trans-
mission channels to their logical conclusions.
These arguments are based on the notion that intergenerational transmission occurs
through permanent income. An additional appeal of considering transitory income is
that if we can identify it to have a signiﬁcant effect, the policy implications would ap-
pear to be more immediate. Essentially: if transitory income affects children’s future
economic status this demonstrates that income per se is affecting a child’s opportu-
nities, which is something that is generally incompatible with even relatively weak
formulations of equality of opportunity. Thus the greater the importance of transitory
income relative to permanent income, the stronger the case for government interven-
tion. In addition, as we note in 7.3, the importance of transitory income implies a
causal role for permanent income too - further strengthening the case for governnment
income support of needy families.
The study by d’Addio (2007) clearly indicates an increased awareness amongst pol-
icy makers of the importance of intergenerational mobility, and by implication a greater
role for mobility studies in inﬂuencing policy. Given that the explicit motivation for
that study is derived from the statement by OECD Social Policy Ministers that: “the
OECD should identify which interventions alleviate and will contribute to the even-
tual eradication of child poverty, break the cycle of intergenerational deprivation, and
develop the capacity of children to make succesful transitions through the life course”
(d’Addio, 2007: 10), it is quite clear that the role for mobility analyses from a policy
perspective is going to be identifying the optimal areas for government intervention.
The kind of problems identiﬁed in this paper that result from neglecting the impor-
tance of transitory income could well affect the validity of any such recommendations.
But on a more positive note, as per the discussion in 7.2, they also present the possi-
bility of identifying both the stages of childhood that are most important for children’s
eventual outcomes, as well as the relative extent of this importance.
33One caution is that whilst transitory income may matter, this does not necessarily
mean that government transfers will have the same effect. On the individual level the
use of different ‘mental accounts’, and at the household level the complications of
intrahousehold distribution of resources, can result in transfers being spent differently
to income that is usually received.60 In the South African context, for instance, Duﬂo
(2003) and other authors such as Case and Deaton (1998) have found that government
pension transfers are most beneﬁcial for children’s outcomes when they are received
by female pensioners.61 As always, the construction of policy upon analytical work
must be done with due sensitivity to the assumptions involved in moving from the one
sphere to the other.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that the implicit structural model which underlies the litera-
ture on intergenerational correlations in income is incomplete, because it fails to allow
for the inﬂuence of transitory parental income on children’s permanent income. As a
consequence, estimates of the IGC based on the associated simple regression model
are likely to be ﬂawed. In Section 4 we present an alternative model, and derive the
probability limits of the estimators used to date in the context of these assumptions.
Our simulation results in Section 5 conﬁrm that inferences of the magnitude of the true
IGE from empirical estimates derived using the standard methods in the literature, and
using the logic of the crude permanent income model, are likely to be ﬂawed. Section
6 and 7 use the implications of our alternative model to empirically ascertain the role
of transitory income.
The primary objective of the paper is to provide a model which allows us to ask
whether (transitory) income matters - as opposed to the rather unsatisfactory, ad hoc
manner in which the question has been addressed in the literature to date. The answer
to the question is, of course, to be found in empirical analysis. Evidence from PSID
data which we present in Section 6 appears to support the notion that transitory income
matters in the United States - to the extent that approximately 20% of the true IGE
in the US may be due to transitory income. Furthermore, income - both transitory
and permanent - may matter more at different stages of childhood; with our results
suggesting that income in early childhood may be up to ﬁve-times as important as
income in other periods.
Given that studies of intergenerational mobility appear likely to inform future gov-
ernment policies, the issue is not merely an academic one. The existing model is biased
toward the conclusion that parental income is not a key determinant of children’s future
economic status, and whilst that conclusion cannot yet be categorically refuted without
further evidence, the foregoing arguments and evidence suggest a much greater causal
role for parental income than the recent literature implies. Considering the concomitant
implications for redistributive social policy, we suggest that conﬁrming this fact - and
the broader validity of the complete model - should be a priority for future research.
60Useful references are Thaler (1990) - referred to previously - and Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hod-
dinott and Kanbur (1995), respectively.
61Although Case and Deaton (1998) did ﬁnd that aside from the impact of the gender of the household
head, pension income was spent in much the same way as other income - allaying concerns about the effect
of mental accounts in that context.
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37Appendix
In this appendix we provide the derivations of the equations used in the text. We begin
with the equations characterising the alternative model outlined in section 4, renum-
bered for this appendix.
y0is = y0i + w0is + v0is (12)
y1it = y1i + w1it + v1it (13)
w0is = δw0is−1 + ξ0is (14)
y1i = ρy0i +
X
q
βq(z0iq) + ε (15)
In these equations y0is represents parental income in year s and y1it represents
the child’s income in year t. Following Mazumder (2001) these are each expressed
as functions of a permanent component (y0i and y1i), transitory component (w0is and
w1it) and a white-noise component (v0is and v1it) respectively.
Where z0iq = y0iq − y0i = (w0iq + v0iq)
and q ∈ Q,s ∈ S,Q ⊂ S
The second term in the fourth equation allows children’s permanent income (y1i) to be
a function of deviations from parents’ permanent income (z0iq).
Q is the set indexing childhood income, so that {q ∈ Q| a < q < b,Q ⊂ ℵ}
K is the set indexing years used in the regression, so {k ∈ K| r < q < m,Q ⊂ ℵ}
And the number of years used in the average are: T = m − r
Estimating the IGE using a Single-Year
If weestimatey1it = β∗y0ik+under theabove assumptions, what is theprobability
limit of our estimated coefﬁcient? We know that the regression coefﬁcient β∗ can be





























38so it remains to determine plim(
P
y1ity0ik):







βq(w0iq + v0iq) + w1it + v1it)(y0i + w0ik + v0ik)




























From equation (14) note that in general:





































w0 , if k is not a year of childhood income
u ρσ2
y0 , if δ u 0.5 and min|q − k| = 10
Theﬁrstandsecondinstancesabovearethebasisforequations(7)and(8)insections
4.2.1 and 4.2.2 respectively.
39Estimating the IGE using a Multi-Year Average
If, instead of using one year of parental income we instead use an average of all
parental income during childhood (where childhood is deﬁned as being from year ‘r’





























































T − δT − 1 + δT
T(1 − δ)2
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ρy0iw0ik + ρy0iv0ik + w1ity0i + w1itw0ik + w1itv0ik + v1ity0i +











































v0 , ∀k ∈ Q
As noted in 1.1 above :

























and recall that k ∈ K and q ∈ Q (see the earlier deﬁnitions of these index sets).











There are seven possible scenarios in terms of the overlap between the sets of child-
hood income (Q) and the years of income used in the regression (K). For the present
purpose - and because in the text we are interested in the contrast with the case where
one year of parental income is used - we shall focus on the scenario in which all years
of childhood income are used in the regression so that K = Q. 63 In this instance the
summed series in brackets above is increasing and then decreasing in δ|q−k|.
So we have:
X
βq(δ|q−r| + δ|q−r−1| + δ|q−r−2| + ··· + δ0 + δ + ··· + δ|q−m+1| + δ|q−m|)








































1 + δ − δ|q−r|+1 − δ|q−m|+1
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1 − δ























































This is equation (9) in the text, where we substitute as follows:
Λq =








T − δT − 1 + δT
T(1 − δ)2

42TABLE 1. OUTPUTS OF IGE ESTIMATIONS ON SIMULATED DATA 
ρ = 0.3    ρ = 0.4    ρ = 0.3      ρ = 0.3       PARAMETER VALUES 
βi = 0.2     βi = 0.1     0 ≤ βi ≤ 0.4, βi ≥ βi+1   0 ≤ βi ≤ 0.4, βi ≤ βi+1  
                              
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE                       
                              
Single year Outside Childhood  0.174    0.232    0.174    0.174      
                              
5year Average Outside Childhood  0.232    0.31    0.232    0.232      
                              
Single year from Mid Childhood  0.397    0.343    0.397    0.397      
                              
5year Average from Earliest Childhood  0.498     0.441    0.70    0.296      
                              
Full Childhood Average    0.617    0.536    0.614    0.609      
                              
Full Average Outside Childhood  0.289    0.377    0.28    0.297      
                              
Full Average over All Years  0.453    0.467    0.45    0.457      
                              
Lubotsky Wittenberg Estimator  0.643    0.546    1.394    1.382      
                              
2.489    1.315    2.489    2.489       Childhood Years Separately with Full 
Non childhood Average as a Control  0.452    0.459    0.452    0.452      
                              
Notes:  1. All simulations are for a sample of 10,000 parent child pairs, with 10,000 repetitions.      
  2. The dependent variable in each case is one year of child's income.      
  3. In each case the true IGE ( ρ + Σβq) is equal to 0.5.      
   4. No controls are used in the regressions. Life cycle variation is not incorporated into the generation of the hypothetical income data. 
       
  
5. The permanent, transitory and white noise components of income are assumed to explain, respectively, 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2 
of the overall variance in children's and parents' income (see the discussion in Section 5).       
                                         